Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams claim to offer a new ontic theory of vagueness, the kind of theory which considers vagueness to exist not in language but in reality. This paper refutes their claim. The possible worlds they employ are ersatz possible worlds, i.e., sets of sentences. Unlike reality, they don’t contain concrete and often material objects. As a result, there is nothing in Barnes and Williams’s description of the theory that the semanticist cannot or does not accept. (...) Thus, they have failed to establish their theory as a genuine intelligible ontic alternative to semantic theories. (shrink)

There is an epistemological skepticism that I might be dreaming now, or I might be a brain in a vat (BIV). There is also a demonstration that derives the skeptical conclusion about knowledge of the external world from the premise C1, i.e., I do not know “I am not dreaming (not a BIV) now.” Pessimistic critics (e.g., F. Strawson, B. Stroud) consider that the refutation of C1 is impossible, whereas others have attempted the direct refutation of C1 (e.g., G. E. (...) Moore, H. Putnam, C. Wright), and some (e.g., F. Dretske, R. Nozick) have attempted to refute the closure principle of knowledge used in the demonstration while permitting the validity of C1. Another scholar, M. Williams, maintains that the skeptical demonstration is true only if we presuppose the epistemological premise that we choose to accept or reject at will. It seems that most critics tend to adopt a strategy that allows them to effectively avoid the skeptical consequence, thereby conceding the validity of C1. However, it is difficult to say whether their attempts succeeded, and in my opinion, they are indeed unsuccessful. This is because their concession to Descartes’ argument is insufficient. Their lack of success could also stem from the incompletion of Descartes’ own methodological doubt. The somewhat paradoxical‐sounding aim of this thesis is to show that the skeptical paradox about knowledge can be dissolved only if the Cartesian skepticism is extended far beyond the endpoint of his attempt. The argument of this thesis is based on the important arguments of Wittgenstein's On Certainty （OC）. (shrink)

This article proposes an essential interrelatedness of Vermeer’s strategies of inclusion and exclusion of an implied beholder. I will argue that such strategies mutually reinforce each other, to the extent that the plausibility of one is arguably dependent upon the possibility of the other. This is evidenced by Vermeer’s subtle manipulations of pictorial space, and the article traces a decisive shift in his familiar use of barriers from those aimed at an external presence to those oriented towards an internal beholder. (...) The feasibility of this interdependence rests upon a theory of imaginative engagement with paintings that can accommodate both an internal beholder and the felt lack of occupancy of the imagined situation’s point of view. I argue that the Dependency Thesis, as set out by M. G. F. Martin, can provide plausibility for both kinds of imaginative engagement with paintings, when sensory imagination is conceived as an instance of imagining seeing. These engagements exploit the notorious emptiness of imagination’s necessarily perspectival point of view. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ken Hanly's recent article in this Journal (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1992) takes issue with Ronald Coase's approach to resolving problems of externalities, as set forth in his classic paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. I argue that Hanly's discussion of Coase misinterprets or inappropriately rejects certain aspects of Coase's analysis, specifically, with regard to the reciprocal nature of externalities and the economic role of government. The resolution of externality problems is presented as an issue of selective normative choice (...) as to whose interests are to count; neither efficiency nor morality claims are uniquely dispositive of the issue. (shrink)

The problem of self-knowledge, originally ethnic, and then national, always excited and continues to worry humanity. At different times, she was sharper, then she calmed down, then stepped forward, then she became one in line with other issues of political, economic and social life. But this problem was inevitable. It was one of the sources of the spirit and activities of the people.

It is common knowledge that many problems in contemporary physics, particularly in microphysics and cosmology, present various infinities of which it is difficult to dispose, and that their role in mathematics is so considerable that it is often defined as the discipline of the infinite. Therefore it would be difficult to deny that infinity exists. But it is just as well known that, over the entire history of science, recognition of infinity has resulted in various difficulties, contradictions, aporias, antinomies, paradoxes (...) — in a word, "much that is impossible," as Aristotle puts it. As phrased by one of the outs tanding mathematicians of the last century, David Hilbert, infinity offers a real challenge to our thinking. (shrink)

The study reveals the feature of determining the limitations of human existence, which affects moral and ethical beliefs and views. It is noted that the philosopher N. Abbagnano saw the need to adjust the philosophy of existentialism, reducing pessimistic tones that could interfere with the development of existential thinking. The aim of the article was to determine the moral capabilities of man in the situations of measuring existence in the positive context of philosophy N. Abbagnano. Accordingly, the study makes an (...) understanding of the role of existentialism as a philosophical current of the twentieth century; the role of death and freedom in human existence is determined; the problem of moral capabilities of a person in situations of limitation is highlighted.Attention is drawn to the key differences between the philosophy of existentialism and romanticism according to the views of the philosopher, from which follows the problem of the specificity of freedom and finiteness of man, as well as the importance of a sense of human life, taking into account his considerations about his finiteness. It is noted that the analysis of the views of existentialist philosophers prompted the philosopher to the idea of determining the positivity of human existence in situations of limitation. The moral responsibility of man is bound, according to N. Abbagnano, with the adoption of responsibility to themselves and society on its own mission, the definition of the limitation of freedom not only the moral principles of the environment, but also their own purpose of life.A special emphasis in the problem of human limitation is given to the theme of death in the philosophy of N. Abbagnano. Death is defined not simply as the fact of a person’s limb or death, but as the possibility of possibility. Death is a situation that no one can get around, and even predict. Therefore, death can interrupt the mission of human life at any time, and a person has no access to the secret of his own death, at least until its occurrence. It is the possibility of death that leads to the moral horizons of man and is prescribed in the moral and ethical environment of co-existence. It is indicated that the possibility has a similar nature to death, because its mystery is revealed when the possibility ceases to be only an opportunity, and therefore it is always beyond human understanding.Nature has a possible total definition of good and evil, which in the philosophy of N. Abbagnano not separated and are not opposed. Freedom Kok rent on both options simultaneously, and multiplied under the influence of freedom in a situation koeksisters. Attention is drawn to the definition of permanent affiliation to cocsistent of existence that begins with birth and does not end until death. And it is through co-existence that the possibility is possible. The moral horizons of koekzistentsii are limited not only by death, as a break in the ties of existence, violations of bindings, but also by the constant existence of good and evil, as inseparable parts of life. Through the creation of morality, man seeks being, seeks that enchanting state of rightness and truth, the finding of which should bring peace of certainty in situations of possibility. The conclusion is made that the limitation of a person to the possibility of the possible, his own finiteness is the positivity of human existence. (shrink)

In recent years, as a result of the extensive employment of the ideas and methods of mathematical logic in cybernetics and computer mathematics here and abroad, there has been a noticeable rise in interest in the methodological problems of this science. One of these is the problem of the relations between mathematical logic and traditional and even modern formal logic. However, when this problem is discussed in our philosophical literature it appears to us that three of its significant factors are (...) neglected by many writers. (shrink)

G I Wall; The Concept of Vocational Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 51–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9.

G I Wall; The Concept of Vocational Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 51–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9.

In the system of the philosophical and sociological ideas of the Frankfurt School the "critical theory" of society occupies the central place. In the "critical theory" are interwoven all the most significant aspects of the philosophical, economic, political, sociological, psychological, aesthetic, and ethical ideas dealt with by the representatives of this school. And therefore it is not accidental that the concept of the "critical theory" of society is employed frequently as a synonym of the social philosophy of the Frankfurt School. (...) The multi-leveled problematique of the "critical theory" of society, and the contradictoriness of the theoretical positions of its adherents, complicate critical analysis. Therefore, the explanation of its methodological orientation, which can help us to understand better the existence and actual philosophical nature of this theory, has important significance for our discussion. (shrink)